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Russian default 1998: when "safe" government bonds broke

In the summer of 1998, Russian government bonds paid more than 50% a year. Many big investors thought a nuclear power would never stop paying. On 17 August 1998, it did.

Story · 7-minute read · Updated 2026-10-21

The world before the default

After the Soviet Union ended in 1991, Russia was rebuilding almost everything. Prices, banks, laws and markets were all new.

The government spent more than it collected in taxes. To fill the gap, it sold short-term bonds called GKOs. These were loans to the government, paid back in rubles.

To attract buyers, Russia had to pay very high interest. Foreign funds and banks bought in.

The idea sounded simple. Earn a huge yield, and trust that a big country won't let its own bonds fail.

Why it got shaky

Three things went wrong at once.

By late May 1998, the central bank raised its lending rate to 150% to defend the ruble. That's a sign of real stress, not strength.

What happened

The rescue that didn't work

In July 1998, the IMF and others announced a rescue of about $22.6 billion. Only a first slice, about $4.6 billion, was actually paid out.

Bond yields fell for a day, then climbed again. By late July, GKOs yielded about 66% a year.

17 August 1998

On 13 August, Russia's stock, bond and currency markets fell hard together.

Four days later, on Monday 17 August 1998, the government and central bank announced three things at once:

  1. The ruble would be allowed to fall, by widening its band.
  2. Payments on short-term government bonds would stop, and they would be forcibly restructured.
  3. A 90-day pause on Russian banks paying back many foreign debts.

In plain words: Russia devalued its money and stopped paying its own bonds on time.

The moment everyone remembers

On 14 August, a dollar cost about 6.29 rubles. On 2 September, the central bank let the ruble float freely.

By 9 September, a dollar cost about 21 rubles. The ruble had lost about two-thirds of its value in less than a month.

Russian banks failed. People queued to get their savings out. Prices in shops jumped.

But the shock didn't stay in Russia.

The fund that was "too smart to fail"

Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) was a US hedge fund run by star traders and two Nobel Prize winners. It made many bets that prices of similar bonds would move closer together.

After Russia's default, investors everywhere ran to the safest bonds they could find. Prices that "should" have moved closer moved further apart.

LTCM had used huge amounts of borrowed money. Its losses grew fast. On 23 September 1998, the New York Fed brought 14 banks together, and they put in about $3.6 billion to take over the fund and wind it down calmly. No public money was used.

The Fed also cut interest rates three times that autumn. Our LTCM story tells that part in full.

What it teaches

1. A high yield is a price for risk

When a bond pays 50% or more, the market is telling you something. That rate is high because people fear they may not be paid back. Read what a bond yield is to see how price and yield move against each other.

The same idea applies to any trade. A big possible reward almost always comes with a big possible loss.

2. In a panic, many things fall together

Trades that look unrelated on calm days can all drop at once in a crisis. That's what correlation means, and why it matters most on the worst days.

Look at your open trades and ask: "What one piece of news would hurt all of these?" If there's an easy answer, they're really one big trade.

3. Borrowed money turns a bad month into the end

LTCM's ideas weren't crazy. Its leverage was. With smaller size, it could have waited. With huge size, it had no time. See leverage and margin explained.

4. Size so you can survive being wrong

Risk a small, fixed slice per trade, about 1%, with a stop set from the chart. Work out your size with the position size calculator. Then a surprise hurts, but it doesn't end your trading.

What it doesn't mean

Timeline

DateEvent
Mid-1990sRussia funds its budget with high-yield short-term bonds (GKOs)
1997Asian crisis makes investors wary of emerging markets
Late May 1998Central bank raises its lending rate to 150%
Jul 1998About $22.6 billion rescue announced; about $4.6 billion paid out
13 Aug 1998Russian stocks, bonds and the ruble fall together
17 Aug 1998Ruble band widened, bond payments stopped, 90-day pause on foreign debts
2 Sep 1998Ruble allowed to float freely
9 Sep 1998About 21 rubles per dollar, up from 6.29 on 14 August
23 Sep 199814 banks put about $3.6 billion into LTCM

Questions

Why did Russia default in 1998?

Russia spent more than it collected, relied on expensive short-term bonds, and earned less as oil prices fell. After the Asian crisis scared investors, it could no longer roll over its debt or defend the ruble.

How much did the ruble fall in 1998?

A dollar cost about 6.29 rubles on 14 August 1998 and about 21 rubles by 9 September. That's a loss of about two-thirds of the ruble's value.

How did the Russian default affect LTCM?

Investors rushed into the safest bonds, so many of LTCM's bets moved the wrong way at once. Because the fund used huge leverage, its losses grew fast, and 14 banks took it over in September 1998.

Did Russia default on all its debt in 1998?

Not all of it. It stopped payments on and restructured its short-term ruble bonds, and paused many private foreign debt payments for 90 days. That's why some sources call it a default and devaluation together.

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